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The emerging interdisciplinary field of “Law and Emotions” brings to-
gether scholars from law, psychology, classics, economics, literature and 
philosophy all of whom have a defining interest in law’s various relations to 
our emotions and to emotional life: they share a passion for law’s passions.1  
They also share the critical premise, or assumption, that most legal scholars 
of at least the last half century, with a few exceptions, have mistakenly ac-
corded too great of a role to reason, rationality, and the cool calculations of 
self interest, and have accorded too small a role to emotion, to the creation, 
the imagining, the generation, the interpretation, and the reception of law.2 
Their scholarship is in part offered as a collective corrective to what they 
perceive as the legal academy’s dominant and ill-conceived bias toward 
reason and rationalism, when explaining legal phenomena.   
At least sometimes and to some degree, and sometimes for better while 
often for worse, according to this body of scholarship, all sorts of legal ac-
tors – legislators, judges, jurors, litigants, private contractors, city council 
members, drafters of constitutions, the authors of universal declarations of 
rights, and of course lawyers and legal scholars as well – are moved toward 
our legalistic decisions or our artful legal arguments by the force of our pas-
sions, rather than by the moral force of either shared or neutral principles, 
deductions from the natural law, inferences from past precedent, or a toting 
of societal costs and benefits.3   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For an excellent summary of the field, see Susan Bandes and Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the 
Emotions, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1997 (2010).  For good collections representing the state of the field, see 
THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); Heidi Li Feldman, Foreward: Law, Psychology, 
and the Emotions, 74 CHI. -KENT L. REV. 1423 (2000); and Passions and Emotions, in NOMOS LIII - 
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (James Fleming ed., 2012). Early influ-
ences include the broad corpus of American legal realism, including Jerome Frank’s LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND (1930) and more recently the scholarship of Martha Nussbaum on emotions and moral 
judgment, particularly Martha C. Nussbaum, LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE (1992).  For a collection of essays 
exhibiting the influence of Nussbaum’s views on the impact of the emotions on moral decision making, 
see Nussbaum and the Law, in PHILOSOPHERS AND LAW (Robin West ed., 2015).  
2 For early and influential critiques, see Lynn Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 
(1987); William J. Brennan, Reason, Passion and the Progress of the Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. (1988); 
Angela P. Harris and Marjorie Shultz, A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason: Toward Civic Virtue in Legal 
Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773 (1993); Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman, Passion For Justice, 
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37 (1988); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988); 
Robin West, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997); Judith Resnik, On the Boas: Feminist Reconsiderations of the 
Aspirations for our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L REV. 1877 (1988); Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-
Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 63 (1984); PETER GABEL, 
ANOTHER WAY OF SEEING: ESSAYS ON TRANSFORMING LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE (2013). For a 
discussion of the recent turn in scholarship and public opinion against empathic judicial decision-
making, see Robin West, The Anti-Empathic Turn, in PASSIONS AND EMOTIONS (James Fleming ed., 
2012).  
3 For a wonderful example of this sort of claim in the context of a biographical treatment of Justice 
Cardozo, see JOHN NOONAN, THE PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1975) 
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More fundamentally, some law and emotions scholars argue, legal theo-
rists have likely accorded too great a role to rationality, and an insufficient 
role to emotion, when describing the origin of the rule of law itself, as well 
as our attachment to it and our ideals for it, as a product of self-interested 
games, metaphoric contracts, or highly rationalistic bargains.4 Legalism, 
they argue, more likely has its origin, as well as its appeal, in the primal 
fears and tremblings we occasion in each other, in our dread of our collec-
tive and individual fates, and at least on occasion, in our hopes for commu-
nity and our love for each other, borne of our mutual attraction and need.  
Likewise, those paths of our law that spring from discretionary judgments – 
whether rendered by judges or administrators – might originate neither in 
logic nor experience, but rather, in any one of a number of decision-
sparking emotions: perhaps by a broad judicial empathy that is in turn 
sparked by narratives, both those of the litigants and of the common law it-
self, or perhaps by an antipathic disdain for or disgust at human frailty, 
rooted in the alienation a deciding judge might harbor toward his deteriorat-
ing biological being, or perhaps by a judge’s infantile craving for an author-
ity figure that will exude both power and love.5   
Judicial hunches that dictate judicial opinions may or may not have caus-
al ties to sound moral intuitions, or be influenced by the judge’s digestion 
of the breakfast he had that morning; we can save that brawl for another 
day.  But it seems very likely that judicial hunches have ties to the judge’s 
emotional coloring, which is itself informed by early life experiences of 
love, need, fear, and human connection.    
Law and Emotions scholars share a very general orientation toward the 
study of all of this: of the irrationality, the passion, and the emotion in all of 
our legal expressions. The impact of this work, viewed collectively, is con-
siderable, and its reach and ambition is admirable.  The law and emotions 
scholars have correctly focused the academy’s attention on the emotional 
root of law’s legislative origins and its judicial interpretation, as well as on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, The Hidden Economy of the Unconscious, 74 CHI. -KENT L. REV. 1599 
(2000); Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of 
the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 817 (1986); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).  
5 For early examples of skepticism regarding the rationality of judicial decision-making, see Joseph C. 
Hucheson, Jr., The Judgment Initiative: The Function of the ‘Hunch’ in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL 
LAW QUARTERLY 274-88 (1929); Karl Llewelyn, Some Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931); Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).  For 
reconstructions of the nature of judging that incorporates affect, pragmatism and rationality, see Duncan 
M. Kennedy, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEA OR IDEOLOGY? 
(S. Hutchinson & P. Monahan eds., 1987); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, Foreword – 
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); Robin West, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997); Shirley 
Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
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the emotional and impassioned human being – as opposed to the cost-
benefit toting calculating subject, or the self-interested egoistic subject, or 
the politically driven subject hungry for his share of either earth or power – 
who is at least oftentimes at the center of law’s gaze, and certainly at the 
center of its might.  This fundamental re-orientation of our scholarly atten-
tion, the handful of basic propositions that re-orientation generates, and the 
body of thought those propositions collectively ground, I believe, are tre-
mendously important and generative; they collectively constitute a real 
breakthrough in our understanding of both the nature of law and of our ide-
als for it as well as our fears of it.  
In my comments this morning, however, I want to pose a question that I 
believe has been neglected by law and emotions scholars, and I will urge 
that we center it.  To summarize my criticism: Law and Emotions scholars 
have looked at emotion’s impact on law and on our understanding of jus-
tice, and at law’s impact on emotional life, and have done so to great effect.  
What they, or we, haven’t much to date investigated, however, are the emo-
tions law produces, or authors, or sires, or births, or fathers – the emotions 
that law itself generates, rather than the emotions that affect law or the emo-
tions that law affects. To echo William James, we have not generated an 
understanding of the “varieties of legal experience.”6  To echo Foucault, we 
don’t look much at the emotions that both law and legalism produce, rather 
than the emotions that impact law, or that are censured, denigrated, or regu-
lated by it.7   
Law and emotions scholarship seems somewhat oddly predicated on a 
conception of law as produced by the sovereign, while emotions, mean-
while, come from somewhere else: they come from the heart, or the hearth, 
or the family, or the intimate or private sphere, or early childhood, or from 
the mother’s breast, but at any rate, they have their genesis somewhere oth-
er than law or politics.  Law and emotions scholars, unlike the more tradi-
tional rationalists, pragmatists, natural lawyers, and legal economists they 
challenge, do see emotions’ influence on law,8 and they see law’s influence 
on emotion,9 but both L and E scholars and legal rationalists share a picture 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (1902).  
7 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1976).  
8 For examples drawn from criminal law, see Susan A. Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact 
Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361-412 (1996);   
Dan M. Kahan and Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 269-374 (1996); Katharine K. Baker, Gender and Emotion in Criminal Law, 28 Harv. J. Law & 
GENDER 447-466 (2005); David Gray, Justice and Mercy in the Face of Excessive Suffering: Some Pre-
liminary Thoughts, in NUSSBAUM AND LAW, (Robin West ed. 2015). 
9 Clare Huntington’s recent work on family law is an excellent example.  Huntington shows how family 
law structures and impact both family relations and the emotions that family produces in various ways, 
often destructive.  CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY 
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of the fundamentally different points of origin of the two: emotion comes 
from heart and hearth and domesticity and social and intimate interaction, 
while law emanates from sovereignty.  
 This seems wrong.  Obviously, it is not across the board wrong – clear-
ly, some of our emotions originate in the private and intimate sphere, and 
much of law does indeed come from the public will of the public sovereign 
– but nevertheless it is wrong enough of the time to misdirect, somewhat, 
this entire field of scholarship.  It is not only the heart, hearth, intimacy and 
family that produce emotion.  And law does not only produce rules and ju-
dicial opinions.  My claim is just that law also produces emotions: some of 
our emotions are a function of law more than a function of family.  If this is 
true, I think it is important both for the study of emotions and for the study 
of law.  
 Here I want to make this claim a little more plausible and much more 
concrete by suggesting that U.S. law produces at least four distinct and 
largely unhealthy emotions in its subjects – that would be us – that merit 
study, and that should be cause for concern.   The four particular legal emo-
tions I will identify and discuss, which I call collectively “law’s emotions,” 
I believe, are harmful in these ways: they alternately undercut our critical 
capacities, alienate us from our own understanding of both our subjective 
hedonic selves and our objective interests, truncate our political and moral 
imagination, and frustrate rather than further important aspects of human 
flourishing. I don’t by any means intend to deny however that the emotions 
I identify and discuss are the only emotions law produces, nor do I mean to 
imply that law doesn’t also produce healthy emotions.  My discussion and 
the examples I’ve chosen are suggestive only.   
So, I will list them here, and then I will take them up sequentially below:  
First, American constitutional law, I will argue, produces outsized authori-
tarian feelings, varyingly, of submission, reverence, respect, and obedience.  
This should be a cause for concern, not the celebration it typically triggers, 
and across the political and legal spectrum. Second, America’s emergent 
“culture of contract,” I will argue, with its promise of liberty, its ethic of 
consent, and mostly its adamant denial of even the existence much less the 
machinations of private power, produces an alienation from our own sub-
jective desires and pleasures, and from any objective sense of our own ex-
pansive human capacities.  The residue is what I will call “consensual dys-
phoria.”  Third, the “equal opportunity society” interpretation of our various 
civil rights revolutions has delivered a dollop of much needed fairness and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
RELATIONSHIPS (2014). See also JANA SINGER, DIVORCED FROM REALITY: RETHINKING FAMILY 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2015).  
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basic justice to public and private institutions that are in sore need of both, 
but it has also produced stark feelings of frustration and anxiety, and a 
stunted capacity for empathy, as we now are taught to assess our own and 
each others’ shortcomings against a presumptively fair and just meritocra-
cy.  And fourth, legalism’s embrace of a perhaps rugged but often violent 
individualism, coupled with its contemptuous dismissal of the profundity of 
the demands placed on those who care for the very young and the aged, 
produces fear, and a lot of it – a degree of real and felt material and physical 
insecurity – and places it right smack at the heart of family life.  That famil-
ial fear has in turn engendered severe emotional disabilities and patholo-
gies. Law and Emotions scholarship, to date, has not focused attention on 
these (or other) dysfunctional or unhealthy emotions that might owe their 
origins to law rather than family.  I want to look at each of these sequential-
ly.  Again, my most modest claim is that these emotions are the product ra-
ther than the subject of law.  They emanate from the legal face of our politi-
cal order, rather than from anything that can be located either in our politics 
or in our private lives.    
A.  IN AMERICA THE RULE OF LAW IS KING 
There is much we don’t understand, in U.S. legal culture, regarding our 
outsized American attachment to the U.S. federal Constitution.  For some 
substantial percentage of American legal scholars, devotion and fidelity to 
the United States Constitution and its institutional trappings is a fully justi-
fied faith: scholars pronounce their belief in the moral virtue of the United 
States Constitution as readily as officials are required to take an oath to up-
hold it.  The meaning of the Constitution is of course hotly debated across 
the scholarly rainbow, as is the means by which we determine it, and by vir-
tually all who study it.  But for a surprisingly high number of American 
Constitutional scholars, and an even broader swath of constitutional law-
yers, its virtue is not.  We neither love, revere, nor swear allegiance to any 
King.  But we do all of that and more to the Constitution.10 
This is odd, somewhat, for a citizenry that prides itself on its antiauthori-
tarian rambunctiousness, but its very odd for a legal academy that prides it-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 There is a fair amount of scholarship noting the profundity and sometimes the irrationality of constitu-
tional faith, but very little that attempts to understand it.  See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FAITH (1988) and OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG 
(AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006); LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
DISOBEDIENCE (INALIENABLE RIGHTS) (2013); Robin West, Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 
765 (1992); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term–Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983); MARK TUSHNET, RED WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (CONSTITUTIONAL THINKING) (1988); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal 
Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1983).  
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self on its embrace of enlightenment values, including a critical stance to-
ward legal authority. Legal scholars of virtually all philosophical persua-
sions, political dispositions, and disciplinary fields pride themselves on 
their skeptical stance toward the value of particular areas of law; indeed, for 
many this skepticism toward the justice of positive law is the very hallmark 
of their jurisprudence, and the defining feature of a professional and schol-
arly legal stance.  No commercial law scholar would declare an undying 
faith in the virtue of the Holder In Due Course doctrine; no contracts schol-
ar would claim that the value of the consideration doctrine is simply off 
limits from critical normative inquiry, no one that I know wants to assert 
that the negligence doctrine in tort law should be loved, no matter its con-
sequences or justice, no family law scholar suggests even in this era of high 
sentimentality that the moral or social or political value of state run legal 
marriage is simply a taboo topic for legal discourse.   
Jurisprudentially, the possibility of criticizing positive law and positive 
legal institutions is a central tenet of legal positivism and natural law both: 
for positivists, the possibility of critical legal thought shows the vital differ-
ence between legal rules and moral ideals,11 and for natural lawyers that 
same possibility shows the objective existence of a realm of moral ideals 
dictated by justice rather than by sovereign power – our critical impulses 
toward law evidence the existence of the natural law.12 Yet, as scholars and 
citizens, we hold constitutional law, and for the most part the institutions 
that created it and perpetuate it, in some sort of critical no-man’s land.  To 
be sure, we criticize a particular case as wrongly decided, a particular court 
as misguided, and an entire area or time period as a constitutional abomina-
tion.  We aim plenty of critical fire on constitutional pariahs – Dred Scott,13 
Plessey v Ferguson,14 Citizens United,15 the Lochner16 era, Roe v Wade17 and 
its progeny.  Some of us criticize particular interpretive approaches as 
wrongheaded or untrue to the spirit of constitutionalism.  But for the most 
part we simply assume the justness of our constitutional baselines – that a 
law might be unconstitutional weighs in our assessment of whether it is un-
just or immoral or unwise, and that a law is just, moral or wise, weighs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM (1982).  
12 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 
(1964).  
13 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).  
14 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
15 Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
16 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
17 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
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heavily as well in our assessment of its constitutionality.18  For almost all of 
us, just as the King’s edicts were once rendered fair and virtuous by force of 
the sun’s sweet rays, so too for our Constitution19: it gets off pretty much 
scot free, critically speaking.  
Why is this?  Why is constitutional skepticism in such short supply? 
Why isn’t skepticism in fact the default, the order of the day, the stance to-
ward the Constitution expected of any decent constitutional scholar?  Here 
are some possible explanations: maybe the reverence is justified.  The Con-
stitution may just be that perfect.  Or, the Constitution’s meaning may be so 
indeterminate that skepticism toward the Constitution itself, rather than to-
ward any particular interpretation of it, is simply not warranted.20  If the 
Constitution can mean whatever the speaker with power wants it to mean, 
Humpty Dumpty style, then critical fire should sensibly be focused on in-
terpretations and those who generate them rather than on the Constitution.   
A third possible explanation is that the Warren Court’s great victories – 
victories for human rights, for civil rights and for fundamental justice – set 
the dye of our current constitutional reverence, just as surely as that same 
era set the dye regarding the Republican party’s electoral hold on the voters 
from southern ex slaveholding states.    
Since Brown v Board of Education, three generations of constitutional 
scholars and lawyers have been steeped in a defining education that stresses 
the virtue not only of a group of wise decisions by particular historical fig-
ures, but in the essential goodness and wisdom of all that facilitated those 
decisions, including the essence of constitutionalism itself: judicial review, 
anti-majoritarianism, the idea of restricting rather than freeing politics 
through foundational law, deep skepticism regarding not the constitution 
itself but rather representative government.  We have been steeped, in other 
words, in a love of reasoned legal principle and a fear of political passion, 
not noticing, perhaps, that love of constitutional reason is itself a passion 
toward which a bit of inspection and skepticism might be warranted.21 The-
se explanations for our constitution-lust are each unsatisfying in different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For a full defense and celebration of the role of constitutionalism in our moral assessments of political 
choices, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
19 I discuss this comparison between Shakespeare’s metaphor for the King’s necessary virtue, and our 
own love of constitutionalism, in Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of 
Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U L. REV. 145, 167 (1985).  
20 This is the account given by the Critical Legal Studies movement for Constitutional Faith.  See MARK 
TUSHNET, RED WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).  
21 The influential writings of Owen Fiss often sounded this note.  See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and 
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).  
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ways, which I won’t enumerate; I have addressed them elsewhere.22 My 
point here is that there are other explanations, and other modes of explana-
tion of this peculiar and indeed exceptional American passion that might 
shed light, and that, I believe, law and emotions scholarship might unveil, 
particularly if we focus on our emotional attitude toward constitutionalism, 
rather than our beliefs regarding it.  
We might, for example, infer a plausible explanation for our Constitu-
tion-lust from Freud’s reflections on the nature of legalism, sketched out in 
his classic essays Totem and Taboo23 and Civilization and its Discontents.24  
Freud famously described both legal and religious impulses – and the emo-
tions those impulses produce – as the result of a mythical contract: not, 
though, the familiar Hobbesian contract, in which a band of otherwise war-
ring brothers turns power over to a political sovereign, so as to better the 
chances of their own survival and to better protect their wealth from the ag-
gression of each other.  Rather, in Freud’s depiction, the brothers band to-
gether, not so as to construct a paternal powerful sovereign who will protect 
them from each other, but rather, so as jointly to kill that paternal powerful 
sovereign who has protected and maybe loved them but who has also terror-
ized them.  In the aftermath of the shock, fear, shame, and guilt that follow 
their patricide, and knowing their own need for authority as well as for nur-
turance, but also knowing their desire for an authority that is not embodied 
in mortal, paternal flesh, they then construct a totem – religious authority, 
or, perhaps, Freud suggests, a Rule of Law. Both yield totemic rather than 
personal or embodied authority: authority that stems from a non-human 
source, but which can nevertheless render both binding edicts and loving 
care. They then abide by taboos – one of which is criticism of the totem.  
Totemic law thus serves a core infantile need: the need for an authority that 
is loving but not threatening, because not human, and to whom an absolute 
fidelity might be granted, without risking one’s own annihilation.25   
My point here is simply that this Freudian story of totems, taboos, and 
authorities, both religious and legal, bears an uncanny resemblance to our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 On the imperfections of the constitution, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); 
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (INALIENABLE RIGHTS) (2013).  For an 
early economic and political critique, see CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).  For an argument that the perceived indeterminacy of the 
constitution has truncated critique of it, see ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN 
INTRODUCTION (2011).  See generally Robin West, Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765 
(1992).  
23 SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO (1913).  
24 SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1930).  
25 For a full elaboration of this argument, see Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: 
Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 817 (1986).  
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own constitutional founding: we slayed a monarchic paternal authority, and 
replaced him with a totemic constitution – an authority of laws, not men, a 
Constitution to worship rather than a King, and most important, a limit on 
the perceived dangers of the highly personalized authority of legislators and 
presidents. 
Freud’s hypothesis may be wildly off the mark.  Our loving embrace of 
our constitution may have nothing at all to do with a deeply wished for but 
deeply denied violent oedipal act followed by the erection of an authority 
that distinctively lacks those embodied human attributes we find so threat-
ening – such as physical power or phallic political will.  But it is suggestive, 
I believe, of an approach to the puzzle of constitutional reverence that de-
serves pursuit.  It explains the emotional dimension of our constitutional 
faith. It explains why it is that our attitude to our own constitution is so 
emotional, why deep criticism is so taboo, why we insist against the evi-
dence of our senses that its authority transcends its human origins or the 
humanity of its interpreters.  Its explains why we insist that it embodies po-
litical virtue while lacking political potency – why we perceive it as both 
the least dangerous branch – as having no fangs – and the most transcen-
dentally nonhuman, non-positivist, moral, principled, passionless, rational, 
and virtuous of all our institutions.  It explains, in other words, why our 
constitutional traditions are both so totemic and so taboo.  The Freudian sto-
ry provides an account of the genesis of this particular, and particularly 
deep, legal emotion: an oedipal emotion seemingly rooted in law’s mythic 
origins, but utterly unrooted from anything attributable to home, to hearth, 
or to a mother’s breast.   
B.  CONSENSUAL DYSPHORIA 
The act of consenting to something, like the formality of contracting, is 
oftentimes a legal act.  It has legal consequences.  When we consent to an 
exchange, we create a contract that otherwise might be a theft.26 When we 
consent to a sexual transaction, likewise we transform a legal encounter 
from what would otherwise possibly be criminal – a rape, or some other 
form of sexual assault – into a legal exchange.27  When we consent to a la-
bor contract, the relationship that might otherwise be an act of enslavement 
is not. As is often enough remarked, consent, not status, now marks the line 
between lawful and unlawful in physical intimacy, in employment, and in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See Randall E. Barnett, Contract is Not Promise; Contract is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 
656-59 (2011). 
27 For consent-based theories of rape, see Deborah Turkheimer, Sex Without Consent, 123 YALE L. REV. 
(2013) for a seminal treatment of rape as non-consensual sex, see SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1988).  
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exchange.28  I will call this type of consent, “legal consent” – acts of consent 
that have the legal consequence of transforming that which is the subject of 
consent into a lawful transaction, rather than the crime or tort it might be 
without the consent. 
    Legal consent plays an outsized role in contemporary jurisprudence.  
An “ethic of consent” polices large swaths of law: contract law is governed 
by it, and increasingly much of criminal law as well.  Rape law reformers 
urge that rape law be reformed so as to better conform to the norm of con-
sent that increasingly informs common or lay understandings of the mean-
ing of rape (thus, drop the force requirement, and define rape instead as 
non-consensual intercourse).29  Even aside from the legality it confers, how-
ever, lawful consent is also becoming the line, culturally, between that 
which is good or perceived as good, and that which is not.30  Thus, we pre-
sumptively believe that the world that follows a lawful consent is a better 
world than the one before it.  Lawful Consent, in other words, makes the 
post consent world a good place, rather than simply a lawful place.  Acts of 
legal consent are presumed to produce worlds that are better than their pre-
consensual predecessors.  The more consensual our world, then, the better.  
Why is this?  What is it that legal-consensual transactions produce that is 
of such indisputable value?  Two answers dominate scholarship and con-
sciousness both.  First, when we proffer lawful consent to some change in 
our world we are acting freely, we believe, and that freedom is itself of 
great intrinsic value.31  Thus, lawful consent is productive of liberty.  And 
second, when we consent to some change in our world, we are also ex-
changing something we have – sex, money or labor – for something on 
which we place an even higher value – intimacy, a consumer good, or a 
wage.  When we make that exchange, we are enriched; if we get something 
in a free trade, we enjoy the additional surplus value, as will the partner to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See Randall E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986); ALAN 
WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS (2003). See generally THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) 
29 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF 
LAW (1998); Deborah Turkheimer, Sex Without Consent, 123 YALE L.J. (2013). For critiques of the re-
form position that rape should be defined as nonconsensual sex, see Michelle Anderson, Negotiating 
Sex, 41 SO. CAL. L. REV. 101 (2005); Jeb Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of 
Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2013); CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1988); Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should not Always be a Crime, 
MINN L. REV. (forthcoming); Ian Ayres and Katharine Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 599 (2005).  
30 For a classic defense, see Richard Posner, Ethical Basis of Wealth Maximization, in THE ECONOMICS 
OF JUSTICE (1981).  
31 Randall E. Barnett, Contract is Not Promise; Contract is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647 (2011). 
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the exchange.32 Thus, lawful consent produces wealth. A post-consent 
world, then, is both richer and freer– consent alone and by definition creates 
value.  Consensual transactions therefore make for a wealthier and freer so-
ciety, whether it be a society of two, of an industry, of a nation, or of an in-
ternational regime.  Consensual exchanges are good by definition.  They’re 
pareto optimal.  As a formal matter there’s no downside.  Everyone gains.   
The question I want to pose regarding legal consent is just this: do these 
acts of consent – legal acts that produce wealth and liberty axiomatically – 
produce anything else?  I think they do: lawful consent at least sometimes 
produces an emotionally toxic undercurrent.  A contract for labor, sex, or 
consumption – our agreed-to exchanges in the workplace, in intimate 
spheres, and in consumer markets – might axiomatically produce wealth 
and liberty, but precisely by virtue of that fact – that we have defined them 
in such a way as to assume they produce wealth and liberty, and that they 
are axiomatically good because of both – they might also, at the same time, 
shut down our capacity to imagine more meaningful forms intimacy or 
work or social intercourse, blind us to unseen alternative ways of being in 
the world, mask the powers and the cruelties within the spheres of liberty 
these legal acts of consent sometimes unwittingly but usually quite witting-
ly create, and reduce our instincts and desire for social, sexual, and com-
mercial connection with others, to a series of permissions borne of precious 
little but shrunken visions, sour grapes, and material necessity.    Thus, our 
commitment to the value of “consensual sex” – no matter how consent is 
defined – might mask or mute or render irrelevant or even psychically dis-
turbing a deeper desire for a less mediated, and vastly more pleasurable 
form of physical and sexual human intimacy than that to be gained through 
bargains trading sexual access for whatever we think we’re getting in re-
turn.  Our steadfast assurance that consensual acts of consumption should 
axiomatically leave us better off might truncate our near-instinctual urge for 
more meaningful human intercourse with the strangers with whom we en-
gage commerce.   
Most poignantly, the legitimacy to which we lend the work we do in la-
bor markets solely by virtue of its consensuality might blind us to our 
shared desires for meaningful and rewarding ways of blending our energies 
with the earth’s natural bounty.  When we have these desires for pleasurable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Richard Posner, Ethical Basis of Wealth Maximization, in THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). For 
critiques of the economic defense of efficiency as ethically grounded in the value of wealth, see Mark 
Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 769 (1979); Robin West, Authority Autonomy and 
Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 384, 388-91 (1985); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract 
and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. 
REV. 563 (1982).  
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intimacy, for a joyous commerce, or for creative work, and then tap them 
down, or trample them, or let them be trumped by our acquired legalist 
knowledge that the work, sex and commerce to which we’ve consented in-
variably create liberty and wealth – so they just must make us happy – we 
alienate our desirous selves and disown our horizons of hope.  The result of 
this may be a disconnection from both our hedonic and our aspirational 
selves.  If so, then law – in this case our legalist valorization of legally bind-
ing acts of consent – produces dysphoria.   
Listen, for example, to Marx’s justly famous and poignant description of 
the consent of a worker to an employment contract with a capitalist: 
 On leaving this sphere (of liberal ideology)... which furnishes the “Free-trader 
Vulgaris” with his views and ideas, and with the standard by which he judges a 
society based on capital and wages, we think we can perceive a change in the 
physiognomy of our [primary actors]. He who was previously the money owner 
now strides in front as capitalist; the possessor of labour-power follows as his 
labourer. The one with an air of importance, smirking, intent on business; the 
other timid, and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to market 
and has nothing to expect—but a hiding.33  
This doesn’t sound like a contractual arrangement between two free peo-
ple that leads them both to an increase in their respective quotas of liberty 
and wealth.  It sounds like lawful consent producing a free contract in the 
sphere of work and labor that truncates the worker’s human potential – a 
truncation of which the worker himself is well aware – for meaningful en-
gagement with the world through work and meaningful and rewarding en-
gagement with the community through social interactions more weighty 
than a contractual weighing of bad options – starvation on the one hand, 
giving his hide for a hiding on the other – followed by a checking the box 
sign-off.  The bad options and their promise of liberty and wealth leave the 
worker “timid and holding back.”  The ethic of consent leads to emotional 
dysphoria. 
Marx’s example of the free labor contract that truncates the human po-
tential for meaningful work, can be expanded beyond his focus on alienated 
labor.  A sex worker in a traditional marriage – say, a wife – who feels 
bound by duty and dependency likewise may consent to sex during mar-
riage, but she too may be timid and holding back, bringing to her marital 
market nothing but her hide and with no expectations but a hiding.  A con-
sumer buying a good motivated by a commercially created desire might 
likewise be timid and holding back, the appearances of consumer sover-
eignty notwithstanding – doing little but satiating an ephemeral and false 
lust, that will in turn prompt not satisfaction, but a cycle of continued frus-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL 354 (1867).  
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tration. The general point is that contractual consent that is marked by 
unacknowledged disempowerment in the private sphere in which the con-
tract is consummated, along with a relinquishment of desire for meaningful 
engagement – either in the sexual, commercial or labor sphere – may reflect 
nothing but the rhetorical sway of a powerful advertiser, or the machina-
tions of centuries of patriarchy that prime women and girls to consent to 
unwanted intimacy, or in the labor market nothing but bondage to circum-
stances only marginally better than the threat of starvation.  Satiation of ar-
tificially created desires may feel better than frustration of those desires at 
the moment, submission to unwanted and unpleasurable and undesired sex 
may be better than the various fears of isolation, abandonment, hunger, vio-
lence or death, that may be the alternative in traditional patriarchal regimes 
and to some degree in liberal regimes as well, and bondage to an employer 
at monotonous work and humiliating wages may of course beat starvation.   
If the freely contracting buyer, wife, sex worker, girlfriend or worker has 
the freedom to enter a contract – which may well offer better terms than the 
felt alternative – and she or he does so, then no question, his or her liberty is 
enhanced and wealth is created.  The feeling such contracts produce, how-
ever, might be far from a feeling of liberation or enrichment.  The consum-
mated contract –whether for labor, market goods, or sex – might squelch 
the piercing pain of fear or hunger or desperation.  But it might also be ac-
companied by a feeling of resignation and an awareness that the alternative 
is some sort of unacknowledged pending doom – the wolf is being kept 
from the door only by virtue of the whimsy of some contractual partner’s 
strength, whose sole virtue lies in the fact that he is not the wolf.  It so, then 
the consent might likewise be accompanied by self alienation – a denial of 
one’s own desires for more meaningful intimacy than that negotiated 
through consent, more meaningful work than that agreed to by a labor con-
tract for wages under conditions of necessity, a more creative engagement 
with the natural world than that envisioned by the marketer of a consumer 
good, the purchase of which is motivated by the imperative to satiate a 
trumped up urge.34   
Acts of legal consent – now such a constant and potent aspect of our le-
gal lives – that are themselves motivated by need, private disempowerment, 
desperation, and fear, might increase a superficial and fleeting contractual 
liberty and might trigger a formal increase in a circularly defined concep-
tion of wealth.  They do so, however, at a cost, a part of which is emotional, 
as Marx reminds us.  Far from satiating desire, some of these consensual 
transactions might squelch it.  Or, more accurately, while they satisfy sur-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 I elaborate on this argument in Authority Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral 
and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 395-400 (1985).  
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face desires, they trample deeper ones: desires for a more human and hu-
mane community, for mutuality in human relation, for a sexual connection 
between human bodily borders that requires no affirmation of consent, for 
something more, that is, than the pact of the withdrawn selves.  
If there’s any truth to this, we’ll know that truth only within a small and 
denied part of a fragile self, the more we convince ourselves, and the more 
we convince others, that consent is a proxy for our wellbeing, that the con-
sensuality of a transaction is the best guide to that which nurtures and sus-
tains. The consensual transaction may well be a sound marker for the dis-
tinction between the legal and illegal, between bargain and theft, rape and 
sex, enslavement and labor; I think it is.  Recognizing it as such is a huge 
and liberalizing advance for the societies that embrace it.  But that does not 
make our present consensual bargains, sexual relations, and employment 
lives the fulfillment of our potential for flourishing lives.  We cut off our 
emotional self-knowledge – our knowledge of the content of our desires, 
and of our capacity for less alienated lives – when we convince ourselves 
that our choices on open markets neatly reflect our preferences, which in 
turn neatly reflect our desire.  That pretense, and the effort to maintain it – 
the sheer effort it takes to pull back, to remain timid, to bring one’s hide to 
market expecting nothing more than a hiding – triggers emotional dysphoria 
– a timid pulling back.  That dysphoria, in turn, is the canary in the mine.   
Our emotional distress at our shrunken consensual world, if nothing else, 
tells us that something is very wrong, when we delegate to sometimes des-
perate acts of consent the work of delineating the capacity for full human 
engagement.   
C.  THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY SOCIETY 
My third example comes from the broad field of civil rights law.  We 
have accepted, both in legal practice and in the worlds of legal scholarship 
and legal ideals, the ideal of an “equal opportunity society” as those laws’ 
best interpretation, and more broadly, as an ambitious conception of social 
justice – a conception of justice tailored specifically for the workplace and 
schoolhouse, but also somewhat for society at large.  So, we often say, 
when referencing our civil rights ideal, that the competitive worlds of op-
portunities – in employment, in education, in political office, and in social 
and civic life – must be available to all, without restriction on the basis of 
race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, ethnicity, religion or age.  All 
should have an equal opportunity to achieve whatever is within his or her 
ability, and consistent with her will, her ambition, and her desire, to 
achieve.  Jobs must be open to all without regard, etc., but the ideal of equal 
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opportunity clearly goes beyond barebones equal employment law or the 
antidiscrimination norm: in a world of equal opportunity, all must have the 
same opportunity to succeed. Neither poverty nor circumstance, any less 
than race or gender, should limit success in life. Sometimes, luck might 
play a role in determining who succeeds or fails, even in a fully fair society, 
but those scenarios should be minimal and diminishing: for the most part, 
the dream goes, we should be judged by our character, and not by inbred 
traits, the vagaries of fate, or the wheels of luck, over all of which we lack 
control. We disagree of course, and mightily, over how to get to such a 
world.  Most of us think, and I believe rightly, that it is clearly not enough 
to simply target intentional acts of racism, ageism, abilitism, sexism and so 
on – centuries of marginalization and subordination leave scars that require 
compensation; substantive equality for subordinated groups is not so readily 
achieved.  Many of us believe that the greatest impediment to such a world 
of equal opportunity is no longer race, gender or any other suspect class de-
fined by immutable characteristics, but rather, inherited wealth on the one 
hand and inherited poverty on the other.  Some believe that targeted affir-
mation actions of any sort on any basis other than perhaps class, will be 
counterproductive and unjust because it is a step backward in the march to-
ward an equal opportunity society, even though it purports to be a step for-
ward.  I want to put these debates over means and particularly over affirma-
tive action aside, and address instead the goal.  Is the ideal of an equal 
opportunity society one that we should so quickly embrace? 
Again, I think our emotional intelligence provides some reason to put on 
the brakes. What emotions might the equal opportunity ideal produce, both 
in theory and, to the limited degree we have achieved it, in practice?  The 
ideal of the fair opportunity society is almost invariably expressed as a large 
but fair game, or race: In the equal opportunity world, we will all play this 
game of life on an equal field.   Once we rid the world of prejudice and the 
injustice to which prejudice leads, we will all start the race with our foot on 
the same line; we all will respond to the same pop of the starting gun, we 
will all play by the same rules, the game won’t be rigged, as Elizabeth War-
ren says.35  No tilts allowed. Now a fair world of opportunity is no doubt 
better than a world in which many start life with a hand tied behind their 
back. The world of equal opportunity, were we to ever achieve it, would 
produce a sorely needed dollop of fairness where none or little has existed 
before.  But is it the ideal to which we should aspire?  Does it exhaust our 
moral imaginations, with regard to hard won civil rights?  What else might 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Speech at Netroots Nation (July 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/elizabeth-to-speak-at-netroots-nation-
rally_55a938f8e4b03f76c5ee2be2.  
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such a world produce, besides a measure of justice?    
I have argued elsewhere that our civil rights traditions if not the laws 
themselves are better understood as expressive of ideals of communitarian 
inclusion rather than as ideals of fair play: they counsel or mandate inclu-
sion of groups once excluded into the public space, into politics, into em-
ployment, into the worlds of education, and into civic life generally.36  Civil 
rights understood as rights of inclusion, I think, better captures the history 
of those laws, and is also a better because more moral interpretation than 
civil rights understood as rights of equal opportunity.  Here, I don’t want to 
argue that point, I want instead to point to the emotional residue which the 
reduction of civil rights to equal opportunity leaves in its wake.   
What emotions are produced by the conflation of the ideals of civil rights 
with the ideals of metaphorically fair games?   There are two that should 
give us pause.   First, in a fair game the winning side both on the field and 
in the bleachers can and does dismiss both the need for and the experience 
of empathy for the pain experienced by a game’s losers. The risk of loss is 
precisely the risk one assumes when playing a game.  The winners, then, in 
an equal opportunity world, then, to the extent the metaphor holds, are as 
justified in turning their back and averting their eye from society’s losers, as 
the fans on the winning side of the bleachers can turn their back on and 
avert their eye from a losing team’s palpable misery.  The losers in the 
equal opportunity world after all have fully consented to the loss and to the 
fairness of it, just as have the losers on the playing field in a fair game.  
So, is the fair game a good metaphor for civil rights?  A refusal of empa-
thy for a game of skill is an emotion that may be commonplace in sports, 
but in life, we should recognize a refusal of empathy, and the willed ab-
sence of its experience, as a terrible and even terrifying limitation on the 
reach of our moral sensibilities across class, ethnicity, race, sex and national 
border likewise, in the rest of life.  That limitation of empathy across groups 
and particularly across class – the failure of people of good will but also the 
failure of people of means to empathize or even understand the struggle and 
pain of people who lack the necessities of a decent life, is hugely worri-
some; it blocks a decent progressive politics, but it also blocks a decent so-
ciety.37   That our dominant understanding of the meaning of our civil rights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Robin West, Toward a Jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Act, in A NATION OF WIDENING 
OPPORTUNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT 50 (Samuel Bagenstos and Ellen Katz, eds., 2014). See also 
Robin West, Freedom of the Church and our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting the Social Contract, in 
THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Zoe Robinson, Chad Flanders, and Micah Schwartzman, 
eds., 2015).  
37 For related critiques of the civil rights ideal of equal opportunity, see some of the seminal writings of 
the Critical Race Theory movement, including Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination 
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 
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revolutions leaves us with a sense of fairness that comes with such an emo-
tional cost – the denial of empathy on the grounds that losers have lost in 
what is now, courtesy of the civil rights laws, a fair game purified of the 
residues of racism and other pernicious inclinations – should count as a red 
flag.   That just cannot be what those laws mean. 
The second emotional residue of the “fair game” understanding of civil 
rights is a state of profound, life-long, adult anxiety.  Risks of failure are in-
dividualized, not only materially, but psychically.  We are not in this foot 
race together, we are each running our own race, and we are running against 
each other.  That degree of competitiveness is poisonous not only for fellow 
feeling, but also for a decent conception of self: the good person, according 
to this most moral and most moralizing of all of our fields of law, is the per-
son who wins the race.  What does that make the rest of us? What is the 
emotional remainder?  What does it mean, for one’s emotional health, to be 
the last to finish the marathon, in an equal opportunity society, what does it 
mean to fail in a fully just society?  
Well, failure, in the equal opportunity society, is entirely one’s own.  It 
can’t be blamed, but it also can’t be shared.  To be judged by the content of 
one’s character, so vastly better than being judged by the color of one’s 
skin, is nevertheless to be judged, taken the measure of, evaluated.   In an 
equal opportunity society, that is a fair game, but also, increasingly, a game 
with winner-take-all stakes, that judgment is relentless, individualized and 
harsh.   
  Almost a hundred years ago, Karl Llewellyn put a similar point thus-
ly:  
 No man will ever understand the age-old problem of "justice" as a going con-
cern who does not keep in mind that one of the vital desires of human beings-
which social institutions must provide for-is not even-handedness, but under-
standing treatment of individual idiocy or weakness. The boss is great because 
he helps out those in trouble. He helps you out first, and helps without regard to 
whether you have been at fault. If you have, he bawls you out-as is his func- 
tion. It does not stop this help. You have no use for what reformers keep calling 
"justice," even-handed, and the law. You need the undeserved aid reformers 
will denounce as favoritism, influence, corruption...The something that you do 
not need to deserve, the wherewithal to bear up against an ill- understood and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(1977); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Re-
trenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 
(1988). For thematically related claims that norms of formal justice in any sphere can retard rather than 
promote full social justice see Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 833 
(2000); RICHARD FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE (2005).  
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arbitrary, bitter world. In a word, then, the satisfaction of a nameless assortment 
of spiritual needs…38 
 
To sum: If fairness is indeed justice, and justice is a pure meritocracy, 
then justice is assuredly not enough.  Pure meritocratic justice may be like 
procedural justice injust this way: there will be an abundance of both in 
hell.  A pure meritocracy is just not a decent interpretation of what either 
justice or our civil rights laws require.  It is a truncation of our dream – it is 
certainly a truncation of Dr. King’s dream – for a blessed community.39   
We should aspire to much more, societally, than a fair competition that 
yields a few winners and many losers who must be satisfied with their lot in 
life, because their loss was the result of a fair game to which they gave full 
consent.  We should aspire to kindness, generosity, and a spirit of shared 
mission and communal life, both in our workplaces and our neighborhoods.  
We’re not, after all, in a footrace.  Our successes belong to all of us, as 
President Obama once made clear in an impolitic moment,40 but so are our 
many failures, which he has yet to say.  We share a common purpose and a 
common lot; the equal opportunity society denies or forgets that.  Excessive 
fears for our own futures, and a flattened empathy for those who for what-
ever reason fall off or choose to take themselves out of the footrace, are tox-
ic emotions that are part of the legacy of that truncated ideal, which, for ful-
ly understandable and even honorable reasons, is nevertheless much loved. 
D.  INDIVIDUALISM, FEAR, AND FAILURES TO THRIVE 
Lastly and much more quickly, our laws and legal institutions rest on a 
baseline ideal of individual self sufficiency and independence that are at 
odds with any reasonable understanding of the needs of caregivers of new-
borns, infants, toddlers, young children, the profoundly disabled and the el-
derly.  Unlike virtually all other mammals, human newborns, infants, and 
toddlers are completely physically dependent upon caregivers for a sus-
tained period of their early lives, and for a much longer period, their emo-
tional health as well is a function of the quality of care they receive while 
dependent.  Children are not plants that thrive on sunshine and water alone.  
They need the physical presence of caregivers if they are to survive the ear-
ly years, and thrive throughout.  The care of an infant, baby, toddler or child 
requires near constant attention – to diaper, clothe, bathe, feed and soothe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Karl Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1293-94 (1932).  
39 See e.g., The King Philosophy: The Beloved Community, THE KING CENTER, 
http://www.thekingcenter.org/king-philosophy#sub4     
40 President Barack Obama, Election Campaign Speech in Roanoke, Virginia (July 13, 2012). “You did 
not build that” (referring to the roads on which entrepreneurs depend….).  
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infants, to talk with and read to and stimulate and interact with babies and 
toddlers, to shepherd older children through the stages of childhood and ad-
olescence – all of this takes years, not moments stolen here and there be-
tween two full time jobs.   Without the minimal care required in infancy, 
children will die.  Without devoted and focused care in babyhood they fail 
to thrive.  Without the committed attention of caregivers through childhood 
and adolescence they will fail to develop emotionally.  The entirely predict-
able result of a lack of sustained care in infancy, babyhood and early child-
hood is pathologically unhealthy adolescents: not only educational deficits 
but also massive failures of the heart that are now widely recognized as be-
ing at the root of moral maturation and societal competencies. The conse-
quence of our collective failure, in this culture, to take care seriously, and 
particularly to take maternal care seriously – our self indulgent propensity 
to privatize it, trivialize it, feminize it, animalize it, and vilify it – is an all 
too familiar array of social pathologies.41  
As is also now well known, caregiving of the sort requisite to the physi-
cal and emotional wellbeing of newborns, infants, toddlers and children is 
inconsistent with the remunerative market-placed labor that is the center-
piece of our love affair in the United States with individualism and self suf-
ficiency. A woman giving birth is obviously incapacitated from otherwise 
remunerative market-based labor; birthing displaces wage or salaried labor.  
Breastfeeding also displaces a good bit of it.  The constant care required by 
babies is inconsistent with hours spent away from them, as is the attentive-
ness required of the caregivers of young children.  Even adolescence re-
quires a degree of focused care and attention that is inconsistent with long 
hours on wage jobs or excessive careerism. Caregivers, therefore, are in 
turn dependent upon others for material support during particularly the ear-
ly years, but in the subsequent years somewhat. Caregivers therefore are not 
fully autonomous, independent, self sufficient beings, pretty much by defi-
nition. Caregiving as a human act embeds one in a web of dependencies.   
As the child (or elder) – the cared for – depends upon the caregiver – the 
caregiver is in turn dependent upon others. A society that overvalues indi-
vidualism will undervalue care.  The damage will be wrought society-wide. 
The quality of care – whether it is sufficient in kind and amount to ensure 
healthy emotional development – is in part – in very large part – a function 
of the felt security and wellbeing of the caregiver. A caregiver who is her-
self or himself fearful of an insecure environment or who lives within a vio-
lent or impoverished atmosphere, or who is working two or three jobs or 
otherwise, simply will not provide the devoted attention, or the interaction, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See generally EVA F. KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR (1998); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997); 
Robin West, Do We Have a Right to Care, in LOVE’S LABOR (1998). 
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or even the educative vocalizing discourse essential for a child’s health, 
emotional wellbeing and maturation. If she is fearful for her own or her 
children’s safety, then her instincts will run toward preservation not nurtur-
ance. If she is fearful of losing her home or shortfalls in food, she will like-
wise be focused on survival rather than the mental stimulation or verbal in-
terplay or interactive games necessary to emotional health. Thus, the new-
newborn, infant, toddler, child or adolescent’s capacity for emotional 
health, are all, in part, a function of the material security of his environ-
ment.  Her freedom from fear and hunger, as well as his need for loving 
care, depends entirely on others, whose capacities are themselves con-
strained by material circumstances. The impoverished caregiver or the care-
giver living under the threat of violence is largely incapacitated from 
providing the quality of care that is essential for physical survival and 
health, but almost invariably from the quality of care essential for the emo-
tional wellbeing of her dependents. The result is a massive mental health 
crisis, with attendant pathologies. 
 We know all of this, with no less certainty than we know the earth is 
warming. Yet like our environmental political will-lessness, here too we are 
will-less. We don’t make the political choices necessary to address the chal-
lenges of caregiving under the stresses of poverty.   
We also, though, don’t challenge or even much examine the legal struc-
tures – as opposed to the political choices –  that produce the care deficit.  It 
is not only the failure of Congress to pass a better because more generous 
Family and Medical Leave Act, or more generous AFDC provisions, alt-
hough both would obviously help.  And it is not only the bad or ignorant 
mothering of poor women or the absence of fathers – parents know it is es-
sential to read to and play with young children, that babies need constant 
care, and that two parents should ideally be present. It is not, in other 
words, solely poor politics or poor culture – absent fathers, uneducated 
mothers, a lack of reading material in the home.42 Rather, the lack of aid to 
needy parents is a part of a broad set of policies deeply embedded in broad 
swaths of our existing law – not just the law that constitutes our inadequate 
welfare net – which taken jointly express a contempt for caregiving, and a 
willful blindness to the incompatibility of caregiving with the ethics we 
most valorize: an individualistic ethic that rewards the market labor that 
sustains self-sufficiency; a competitive work culture that punishes those 
dragged down by dependents, a communal life that holds life giving in dis-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See James Heckman, Promoting Social Mobility, BOSTON REVIEW (Sep. 1. 2012), 
http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/promoting-social-mobility-james-heckman.  
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repute while glorifying and permitting heavy doses of both individualistic 
and state violence.  Employers fire employees at will, by virtue of contract 
law.  Individuals lawfully bear arms – a right that has caused domestic vio-
lence lethality to soar – by virtue of constitutional law.  Workplaces are still 
structurally hostile to parents, by virtue of the sad limits of equal employ-
ment law.  States incarcerate young parents blithely for insignificant crimes 
and with no regard for those parents’ caregiving obligations.  The commu-
nal support we begrudgingly grant poor caregivers is sometimes not enough 
to meet basic needs of survival, and never enough to provide quality care 
that ensures mental health. And so on and on and on, again, through large 
swaths of our public and private legal codes.   
Of the questions neglected by law and emotions scholars, this one is the 
elephant in the room – it is so obvious it has become white noise.  Law cre-
ates the material and psychic conditions of our lives within which healthy 
and life sustaining emotions will take root, will develop, or will die.  Some-
times, though, it creates conditions within which those emotions fail to de-
velop at all – it creates the conditions within which healthy emotions are in 
effect still-borne. The capacity of loving caregivers to provide the attentive 
loving care that is necessary for mental and emotional health of dependents 
is largely dependent on the caregivers’ own freedom from fear and over-
powering anxiety. And that freedom is a function of law. The law, there-
fore, and not only a father’s presence or a mother’s good will or level of 
education or intelligence or linguistic facility, determines, in part, and in-
deed in large part, whether a caregiver’s love is poisoned by her own fear 
and anxiety, and hence whether a newborn or a baby will suffer from a fail-
ure to thrive, or whether a child will suffer from insecure attachment, or 
whether an adolescent is burdened by psychopathologies born of isolation.   
Put differently it is not only bad economic conditions, or poverty, or cul-
ture, or the breakdown of family, or the absence of fathers, creating the 
emotional ill health behind social pathologies.  Our substantive law – fami-
ly law, of course, but also contract law and property law and constitutional 
law, and antidiscrimination law and administrative law and so on – is com-
plicit. We need to hold the law and the bodies of law that produce emotion-
al toxicity accountable, and to do so we need to examine the multiple con-
nections, causal, circumstantial, intended, or not, between not only law and 
the emotions it consciously seeks to regulate or suppress or honor, but also 
between our socially widespread emotional ill-health and our various legal 
cruelties. 
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CONCLUSION 
Law produces emotions; emotions originate not only at a mother’s breast 
or a father’s hand or a functional or dysfunctional family dynamic. US Con-
stitutional law produces a reverence for constitutionalism that smells un-
pleasantly of authoritarian emotionalism.  US private law produces consen-
sual dysphoria: the feeling of agitation and doubt that results, when the 
work of delineating the conditions for human flourishing are reduced to the 
task of tallying up acts of consent. Anti-discrimination law produces a con-
ception of justice overly invested in fair play, that in turn relegates most cit-
izens to the role of the also-rans in athletic events, with its attendant emo-
tional overhang: a lack of societal solidarity and communitarian purpose, 
and a constant fear of falling short, of losing a race set up entirely so as to 
reward only the fleetest of foot. And finally our threadbare poverty law 
produces familial fear, and hence emotional ill health: babies, children and 
adolescents who fail to thrive, who too often then become adults who fail to 
empathize, or socialize.  These are emotions, and they are produced, not just 
regulated by or informed by law.  They are fathered by it.   
The law’s production of emotions deserves study. To date it has received 
it only sporadically: Peter Gabel, in the eighties, looked at what I’m calling 
consensual dysphoria; Clare Huntington, today, is looking carefully at fami-
ly law’s production of emotional ill health.  There are other examples as 
well.  But these efforts are exceptional; there is no sustained inquiry along 
these lines.  That there isn’t, says something about the youth of the move-
ment. It also, though, says something about our contemporary self-
understandings: we tend to overly privatize emotions, and we tend to hold 
law harmless. Law might reflect emotion, might be influenced by emotion, 
might regulate emotion, and might precipitate emotional outbursts.  But law 
just can’t be the sort of thing that actually produces emotion, so it can hard-
ly be held accountable for doing so in a way that is damaging.   
This set of assumptions is wrong-headed from top to bottom: Law pro-
duces emotions, some of which are destructive.  It can also produce emo-
tions, of course, which are essential to human flourishing.  But I suggest a 
critical stance, rather a celebratory mode should motivate this work: right 
now, we live and work within a legalistic order that worships constitutional 
authority, celebrates consensual ethics, has settled for equal opportunity, 
and trumpets the value of individual self sufficiency. Each of these individ-
ually, and certainly all jointly, produce toxic legal emotions.  They should 
be in the cross hairs of all of our critical impulses.    
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